By Kit Klarenberg â Oct 3, 2024
A little-noticed report published September 19th by JINSA laid out how the Empire will be on the defence, and at grave disadvantage, in all-out hot war with Iran.
On October 1st, Iran launched scores of missiles at the Zionist entity, in response to the murder of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, among many brazen provocations and escalations targeting the Resistance in recent months. Voluminous footage of key Israeli infrastructure, including military and intelligence sites, being comprehensively flattened by the Islamic Republicâs inexorable onslaught has circulated widely, amply contradicting predictable claims emanating from Tel Aviv and Washington that the blitzkrieg was successfully repelled by Western air defence systems.
It is the largest, most devastating attack on the Zionist entity in its 76-year history. The full impact is not yet apparent. While US officials worriedly warned hours in advance they possessed âindicationsâ Iran was preparing to attack âIsraelâ, the incursionâs timing, scale, and severity caught all concerned by surprise. Washington dispatching thousands more troops across West Asia in the days prior, explicitly in âIsraelâsâ defence, was evidently no deterrent to Tehran.
That deployment came replete with a supposedly rock-solid Pentagon pledge to come to the rescue should the Islamic Republic seek to repeat the historic, wide-ranging drone and rocket barrage to which it subjected the Zionist entity in April. Department of Defense apparatchiks boldly declared they and Tel Aviv alike were âeven better prepared for a new Iranian attackâ than last time round. The ease with which âIsraelâsâ purportedly impregnable Iron Dome was bested exposes this braggadocio as hopeless hubris at best, dangerous delusion at worst.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is ever-cautious, and has acted with extraordinary restraint since the 21st century Holocaust erupted in Gaza. Some analysts have interpreted this implacable self-control, and Tehranâs lack of immediate backlash against acts such as the audacious assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on Iranian soil, as not merely rigid reluctance to escalate into all-out war with âIsraelâ and its Western backers, but an inability to respond at all. Tel Avivâs unprecedented October 1st battering should dispel any such inference.
Senior Israeli politician Yaiv Golan, who returned to Israeli Occupation Force (IOF) service following October 7th, has branded Iranâs latest assault a âdeclaration of warâ against the Zionist entity. Notorious Benny Gantz boasts Tel Aviv âhas capabilities that were developed for years to strike Iran, and the government has [our] full backing to act with force and determination.â Meanwhile, IOF spokesperson Daniel Hagari declares, âThere was a serious attack on us and there will be serious consequences.â
The IRGC appears to have calculated such threats and pronouncements are as empty and meaningless as the Pentagonâs pledge to be âbetter preparedâ for a future Iranian strike. At the very least, the Islamic Republic fears no Anglo-Israeli retaliation to its latest broadside. That may mean Tehran has grounds to believe the balance of power in the region, and in any future large-scale conflict with the Zionist entity and West, has irrevocably tipped in favour of the Resistance.
Eerily, a little-noticed report published September 19th by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), a powerful and shadowy Zionist lobby organisation, inadvertently reached this same conclusion. It laid out in forensic detail how the Empire will be on the defence, and at grave disadvantage, in all-out hot war with Iran. Along the way, a blueprint for Resistance victory was plainly sketched. With Tehran having thrown down a gauntlet on October 1st, we could now be seeing that plan being put into action.
âGaining Overmatchâ Titled U.S. Bases in the Middle East: Overcoming the Tyranny of Geography, JINSAâs report was authored by former CENTCOM commander Frank McKenzie, who oversaw the Empireâs disastrous retreat from Afghanistan. It appraises the viability, value, and force projection capabilities of current US military installations throughout West Asia, focusing on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. The findings are stark, calling for an immediate overhaul of American basing across the region:
âOur current basing structure, inherited from years of haphazard decision-making, and driven by divergent operational and political principles, has yielded installations that are not optimally situated for the most likely threats of today and the future in the region.â
Despite mentioning âthreatsâ in plural, JINSAâs sole focus is the Islamic Republic. While a myriad of issues with the Empireâs modern day positioning throughout West Asia are identified, the âmost importantâ conclusion drawn is that Washingtonâs âcurrent basing array detracts from our ability to deter Iran and fight them effectively in a high-intensity scenario.â McKenzie is nonetheless at pains to portray Tehran as somewhat feeble and vulnerable:
âThe Iranians have no army that can be deployed as an invading force. They have a small and ineffective navy, and in practical terms, no air force. Their missile and drone force, though, is capable of gaining overmatch against many of its neighborsâŠthey can deploy more attacking missiles and drones than can be defended against.â
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As such, JINSA notes, âa theater-level war with Iran would be a war of missiles and drones,â and Tehranâs April 13th attack on âIsraelâ was a âcomprehensive demonstration of Iranian operational design.â The IRGC sought to overwhelm the Zionist entityâs air defences and radar systems with waves of low-cost drones and cruise missiles, to âmake it difficult for Iron Dome or Patriot to engage the ballistic missiles that followed.â
Given what went down on October 1st, McKenzie correctly forecast that the April strike would âprobably remain the basic template for large-scale Iranian attacks.â He appraised the effort â âat least conceptuallyâ â as âa sound one,â from which âthere are lessons for all to learn.â The most pressing and âobviousâ takeout for JINSA was that, âfor the defenders of the Gulf, it will be a war of strike aircraft, tankers, and air and missile defenseâŠand here is the problemâ:
âThese aircraft are largely based at locations along the southern coast of the Arabian GulfâŠan artifact of planning against Russian incursions in the 1970s, and the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns of the early decades of this century. They are close to Iran, which means they have a short trip to the fightâŠbut that is also their great vulnerability. They are so close to Iran that it takes but five minutes or less for missiles launched from Iran to reach their bases.â
The âthousands of short-range missilesâ Iran possesses are also a key negative âfactorâ, offering âno strategic depth.â While an F-35 fighter jet âis very hard to hit in the airâŠon the ground it is nothing more than a very expensive and vulnerable chunk of metal sitting in the sun.â Refuelling and rearming facilities on US bases in West Asia âare also vulnerable, and they cannot be moved.â Most damagingly of all:
âThese bases are all defended by Patriot and other defensive systems. Unfortunately, at such close range to Iran, the ability of the attacker to mass fires and overwhelm the defense is very real.â
In closing his roadmap to Tehranâs victory, McKenzie bitterly laments, âIt is hard to escape the conclusion that our current basing structure is poorly postured for the most likely fight that will emerge.â The Empire âwill not be able to maintain these bases in a full-throated conflict, because they will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack.â Imperial overreach in West Asia has now fallen victim to âthe simple tyranny of geography.â And all along, the Islamic Republic has been taking rigorous notes:
âThe Iranians can see this problem just as clearly as we do, and that is one of the reasons why they have created their large and highly capable missile and drone force.â
âNothing but forceâ For all the JINSA reportâs doom and gloom, McKenzie does express some optimism â of the most fantastical, self-deceived kind. For one, he suggests Iran cannot threaten the Empireâs âcarrier-based aviationâ capabilities. Still, he concedes âthere arenât enough carriers, and therefore naval aviation will probably not be the central weapon in a fires war with Iran.â The former CENTCOM chief also conveniently overlooks AnsarAllahâs recent crushing defeat of the US Navy during Operation Prosperity Guardian, which unambiguously exposed the redundancy of US aircraft carriers altogether.
Elsewhere, McKenzie declares that the Empire âneeds to move aggressively to develop basing alternatives that demonstrate that it is prepared to fight and prevail in a sustained high-intensity warâ with Tehran, and therefore âovercome unfavorable basing geography.â One radical solution proposed by the JINSA report is to âconsider basing in Israelâ. US military presence in Tel Aviv has already been slowly growing over recent years. While largely unacknowledged and downplayed, it has proven incredibly controversial every step of the way.
In September 2017, the IOF announced the arrival of Americaâs first permanent military installation in the Zionist entity. Such was the backlash domestically and regionally, that officials in Washington raced to deny this was the case, prompting a major cleanup of IOF websites referencing the site. Any move to create a fully-fledged US base in âIsraelâ, explicitly for war-fighting purposes, would inevitably spark even greater outcry, and be seen as a major escalation by the Resistance, demanding a drastic response.
Such an eventuality undoubtedly didnât occur to the former CENTCOM chief. His analysis is hazardously unsound and fallacious in other areas too. On top of âIsraelâsâ âgeographic advantagesâ, he praises Tel Avivâs âpowerful, proven air and missile defense capability.â It was this âcompetenceâ, combined with âUS and allied assistance, and the cooperation and assistance of Arab neighborsâ, that ensured Iranâs April strike on the Zionist entity was a âfailureâ, McKenzie muses.
He appraises this group effort, which supposedly prevented Iran from delivering decapitation strikes against the Zionist entityâs military and intelligence structure, as âin every measurable wayâŠa remarkable success story.â If McKenzieâs view was shared by the Pentagon, this may explain why the US was so caught off guard by, and ill-prepared for, Tehranâs recent bludgeoning of âIsraelâ. Far from an embarrassing cataclysm, the April effort was a spectacular success, which exposed âIsraelâsâ fatal weaknesses, and reshaped West Asia forever.
Far from wanting too deliver a death blow, the Islamic Republic sought to deescalate via a measured, well-advertised show of strength, while avoiding a wider response. In the process, the IRGC demonstrated that if it wished, in future it could successfully bypass the Iron Dome, and would wreak immense destruction. Then, a ânew equationâ was spelled out by a Corps Commander:
âIf from now on the Zionist regime attacks our interests, assets, personalities, and citizens, at any point we will attack against them.â
This message was evidently not received in corridors of power in Brussels, London, Tel Aviv, and Washington. Whether it will finally be comprehended now that Tehran has struck once again deep into the Zionist entityâs putrid heart remains to be seen. As Russian military strategist Igor Korotchenko once observed, âthis Anglo-Saxon breed understands nothing but force.â
(Al Mayadeen â English)